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ABSTRACT 
With the birth of RFID technology, businesses gained the 
ability to tag products with practically invisible computer chips 
that relay information about consumer behavior to remote 
databases. Such tagging permits retailers and manufacturers to 
track the purchases, identities, and movements of their customers. 
In the absence of enforceable regulations, society risks being 
subjected to an unprecedented level of Orwellian surveillance. This 
iBrief addresses consumer privacy concerns stemming from the 
proliferation of RFID technology. It discusses why tort law, state 
legislation, FTC guidelines, and proposed regulations are 
insufficient methods to alleviate consumer privacy concerns and 
suggests amending various federal privacy laws, thereby 
prohibiting the underlying RFID tracking behavior.  
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 A problem has arisen at the intersection of privacy and technology.  
There is “an amazingly ambitious scheme to infest the entire physical 
infrastructure of the planet with a spray-on global blanket of Internet 
interactivity.”2  This “global blanket” is comprised of small data chips 
placed in moveable objects across the world that wirelessly communicate 
information about objects and their purchasers to anyone who has the 
technology to track it.  The idea for the product-tracking technology was 
developed in 1997 as a result of the popularity of Oil of Olay’s ColorMoist 
Hazelnut No. 650.3  The inventor was neither a government agency nor an 
engineer.  Rather, it was Kevin Ashton, a brand manager for Proctor & 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, 2008; B.S., Cornell 
University, 2004. I am grateful to Professor Sarah Ludington for her guidance 
and to the Duke Law and Technology Review staff members for their assistance.  
2 Bruce Sterling, Preface to KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIZ MCINTYRE, SPYCHIPS: 
HOW MAJOR CORPORATIONS AND GOVERNMENT PLAN TO TRACK YOUR EVERY 
MOVE WITH RFID, at xi (2005). 
3 Cathy Booth-Thomas, The See-It-All Chip, TIME.COM, Sept. 22, 2003, 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005756-1,00.html. 
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Gamble.4  Ashton, attempting to resolve a supply-chain quandary over the 
overwhelming popularity of lipstick, determined that placing a small chip, 
known as a Radio Frequency Information Device (RFID), on all lipstick 
packages would solve his stocking dilemma. He tested his idea in Broken 
Arrow, Oklahoma. When a customer removed the lipstick from the shelf, 
the RFID on the product’s packaging sent information to databases in 
Cincinnati, informing Wal-Mart of reordering needs.5  While RFID 
technology helped solve Wal-Mart’s and other retailers’ stocking problems, 
it also opened a Pandora’s Box of privacy issues.  Currently, there are no 
enforceable laws to control the spying and tracking actions of businesses 
and private individuals.  Without regulations, the use of RFID chips in 
consumer products raises fears that “consumer behaviors” will be 
monitored, “third-party surveillance” will occur, “customer relationship[s]” 
will be managed, and individuals’ identities and locations will be 
susceptible to constant monitoring.6  
¶2 This iBrief will address the issues surrounding consumer privacy 
and RFIDs.  Specifically, Part I will discuss the basic principles of RFID 
technology, detailing the various components of RFIDs and discussing how 
the technology functions as a communication device.  Part II will address 
the scope of RFID use in the commercial environment, including its 
efficiencies and inefficiencies.  Part III will evaluate the intrusion upon 
                                                     
4 Ashton then left Proctor & Gamble to run the Auto-ID Center at MIT, where 
RFID standards are set. Kevin Maney, RFID: Robot for Infinite Decluttering?, 
USATODAY.COM, Oct. 6, 2004,  
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/maney/2004-10-05-
maney_x.htm. Ashton is now working at ThingMagic, an RFID start-up. Id. It 
should also be noted that RFID technology was initially used in World War II by 
the British army as radar-like devices to identify friendly aircrafts. Laura 
Hildner, Defusing the Threat of RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through 
Technology-Specific Legislation at the State Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
133, 133 (2006) (citing Radio Frequency (RFID) Technology: What the Future 
Holds for Commerce, Security and the Consumer: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 10 (2004) (statement of Sanjay Sarma, 
Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology)), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/crcl/vol41_1/hildner.pdf.  
5 Cédric Laurant, Policy Counsel of the Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Testimony on 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology: What the Future Holds for 
Commerce, Security, and the Consumer (July 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/rfidtestimony0704.html (citing Chipping Away 
at Your Privacy, Chi. Sun-Times, Nov. 9, 2003, at 36). 
6 STAFF OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: 
APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 1–2, 14 (2005), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050308rfidrpt.pdf. 
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seclusion tort as a theory of privacy protection and criticize the inability of 
this tort to keep pace with technological developments.  Part IV will detail 
the challenges of using tort law to redress RFID offenses.  Part V will 
analyze the various approaches of protecting consumers’ privacy from 
RFID tracking, including legislation at the state level and regulation 
proposals from privacy advocates.  Lastly, Part VI will provide suggestions 
for the most effective RFID legislation and the steps necessary for 
implementation of that legislation.  
ANALYSIS 
I. WHAT ARE RFIDS? HOW DO RFIDS WORK?  
¶3 RFID technology is an automatic identification system that 
identifies objects, collects data, and transmits information about the object 
through a “tag.”  A device called a reader extracts and processes the 
information on the tag.  Experts characterize RFIDs as devices “that can be 
sensed at a distance by radio frequencies with few problems of obstruction 
or misorientation.”7  In essence, RFIDs are wireless barcodes.8  However, 
unlike typical barcodes, which are identical for all common products, each 
RFID has a unique identification.  Therefore, every individually tagged item 
has a different barcode sequence.  Typical barcodes also require 
unobstructed paths for scanning, whereas RFIDs can be scanned through 
solid objects.9  RFIDs have communication signals that facilitate data 
storage on RFID tags and enable the stored information to be gathered 
electronically—hypothetically permitting, for example, Coca-Cola to have a 
database storing information about the life cycle of a Coke can.  The 
database would contain tracking details from the moment the can is 
manufactured through its processing at a garbage dump—since RFID 
readers can be attached to garbage trucks.  Between the birth and death of a 
customer’s Coke can, the RFID tags would tell the Cola-Cola Company 
where and when the Coke was purchased, what credit card the Coke was 
purchased with, and, in turn, the identity of the purchaser.  Even if the 
customer did not purchase the Coke with a credit card, state issued ID cards 
equipped with RFID technology could relay the customer’s identity to 
RFID readers as he or she leaves the store.10  Coca-Cola’s final product of 
                                                     
7 KATHERINE ALBRECHT & LIZ MCINTYRE, SPYCHIPS 13 (Nelson Current 2005) 
(quoting Raghu Das, RFID Explained: An Introduction to RFID and Tagging 
Technologies, ID TECHEX (2003). http://idii.com/wp/IDTechExRFID.pdf. 
8 RFID chips can be contrasted with barcodes, which use “optical line of sight.” 
Id. 
9 Id.  
10 See Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 231 Stat. 119 (2005), available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ013.109 
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the RFIDs’ communications is a database of the life cycles of individual 
cans of Coke and personal information about their purchasers.11  With this 
myriad of information, Coca-Cola has the ability to individually market to 
each of the 1.3 billion daily Coca-Cola consumers.12  
¶4 There are three components of an RFID that permit the life cycle of 
a Coke can to be tracked:  a chip, an antenna, and a reader.  Together, the 
chip and the antenna are called a tag. A unique identification number, called 
an Electronics Product Code, is encoded in a small silicon chip that is 
typically smaller than three square inches.13  The antenna, which can take 
the form of many shapes, radiates from the chip.14  The antenna sends out 
radio signals that trigger the tag and permit information to be written onto 
and read from it.15  The third component of an RFID is the reader.  Also 
called the scanning device, the reader communicates with the tag through its 
own antenna.16  Once an RFID tag comes within a few feet of the reader, 
the tag’s antenna finds the reader’s signal and directs the energy to the 
chip.17  The chip then beams its unique identification number and other 
information stored on the chip to the reader.  The reader then processes the 
information and typically relays the data to a database where it can be 
tracked and stored.  Readers range in price from $20 to $1000. One variety, 
costing $150, is even adaptable to PDAs.18  The low cost and ability to store 
a reader in the PCMCIA slot of a PDA permits businesses and individuals 
to own and use readers at their leisure.  
¶5 There are passive and active tags.  Passive tags are dormant until a 
reader beams the tag.  Scanning by the reader activates communication 
between the devices.  Active tags, on the other hand, are simply passive tags 
with an energy source, permitting them to continually transmit information, 
                                                                                                                       
(authorizing Department of Homeland Security to require state ID cards and 
drivers licenses to be equipped with RFID technology). 
11 While database storage poses an entire privacy issue on its own, exploration 
of database privacy is beyond the scope of this iBrief.  
12 The Coca-Cola Company, http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/citizenship/our_business.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).  
13 The smallest chip, produced by Hitachi, is 0.3 square millimeters. Hitachi 
Unveils Smallest RFID Chip, RFID J., Mar. 14, 2003, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/337/1/1/. 
14 ALBRECHT &  MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 14.  
15 David Flint, Everything With Chips!, BUS. L. REV., Mar. 2006, 73, 73.  
16 STAFF OF THE FED, supra note 6, at 4 (citing RSA Laboratories, 
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007)).  
17 ALBRECHT &  MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 16.  
18 Get RFID Readers in a Flash, RFID J.,  Apr. 22, 2003, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/393/1/1/; Toppan to produce $20 
RFID Reader, RFID J.,  Jan. 23, 2003, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/279/1/1/.  
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without the activation of a reader.  The cost for a passive tag can be as low 
as a few cents, and passive tags are typically priced between $0.20 and 
$0.40.19  From a cost standpoint, the tags’ low cost permits essentially all 
merchandise to be tagged with RFIDs.  Although passive tags appear 
passive, by installing readers at various entrance points, including store 
entrances and freeway exits, the tags are essentially functionally active.20  
Locating the whereabouts of persons and objects simply requires scanning 
passive tags at these points of entrance.  Because readers can scan multiple 
tags simultaneously, one reader can capture a great deal of location and 
information data in a short span of time.  
II. HOW ARE RFIDS USED?  
¶6 RFIDs are currently used in many ways, including, “livestock 
management[,] 24 hour patient monitoring[,] authentication of 
pharmaceuticals[,] tracking consignments in a supply chain[,] remote 
monitoring of critical components in aircraft[, and] monitoring the safety of 
perishable food.”21  Advocates of RFID technology, including retailers and 
manufacturers, praise the increased functionality and efficiency that will 
likely ensue from using RFIDs.  Once all products are individually tagged, 
shoppers are expected to be able to purchase items without checking-out.  
This should be possible since RFID readers will be able to scan every item 
as the customer exits the store and charge an RFID credit card, thereby 
simultaneously increasing efficiency and possibly reducing shoplifting.  
Other RFID uses include easy monitoring of product recalls, tracking 
lobsters for conservation purposes, and purchasing products with 
transaction-free payment systems.22  Additionally, in October 2003, the 
Department of Defense set standards mandating suppliers to place RFID 
                                                     
19 RFID System Components and Costs, RFID J., 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleprint/1336/-1/129/ (last visited Feb. 15, 
2007).  
20 ALBRECHT &  MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 5. 
21 Viviane Reding, Member of the European Commission responsible for 
Information Society and Media, Address at EU RFID 2006 Conference: 
Heading for the Future, RFID: WHY WE NEED A EUROPEAN POLICY, 1, 3 (Oct. 
16, 2006), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/597&f
ormat=PDF&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; see also MICHAEL J. 
TAVILLA, RFID, NAT’L ELEC. COMMERCE COORDINATING COUNCIL 5-7 (2005), 
http://rfidprivacy.mit.edu/access/pdfs/report-ec3.pdf. 
22 Flint, supra note 15, at 1. 
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tags on all packaging for the Department of Defense.23  Thus, RFIDs can be 
used to increase efficiency and safety.  
¶7 The RFID uses enumerated above, however, are not the uses that 
drive privacy concerns.  Rather, it is the spying on individuals and the 
profiling of their identities that are at issue.  According to a study provided 
by Auto-ID Center, seventy-eight percent of consumers are “extremely or 
very concerned” about the uses of RFID technology24—likely because they 
fear customer profiling and care about keeping their identities private from 
businesses.  These concerns stem from the lack of current laws protecting 
consumers from data collection and sharing.  Some companies cannot be 
trusted with the data that they collect, and existing privacy laws do not help 
individuals hide the information they expect to be concealed from the 
public.25  A consumer who purchases RFID tagged items is vulnerable to 
various types of surveillance.  For example, consider customers carrying 
RFID-enabled health-insurance cards in their wallets purchasing shopping 
carts full of junk food at the grocery store.  If the health insurance company 
placed RFID readers at grocery store entrances, the reader would activate 
the RFID tag in the consumers’ wallets and collect information about their 
recent grocery purchases.  From the health-insurance card the insurance 
carrier could determine the customers’ identities and learn that they are 
prone to diabetes.  When the junk food purchases are aggregated into their 
policy files, the purchases could trigger increases in the consumers’ health 
insurance.  
¶8 The capabilities of RFID technology now permit businesses to 
snoop into the lives of customers in ways that were never before possible.26  
                                                     
23 PRESS RELEASE, US DEP. OF DEFENSE, DOD ANNOUNCES RADIO FREQUENCY 
IDENTIFICATION POLICY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEWS 
RELEASE, (OCT. 23, 2003), 
 http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031023-0568.html. 
24 ALBRECHT & MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 154 (quoting PHYLLIS L. KIM, 
FLEISHMAN-HILLARD, AUTO ID CENTER COMMUNICATIONS (2001), 
http://cryptome.org/rfid/pk-fh.pdf); see Beth Bacheldor, Study: RFID Not Well-
Known by Consumers, INFO.WK., June 24, 2004, 
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=22101950.  
25 See Anick Jesdanun, 3 AOL Subscribers Sue Over Data Release, ABC NEWS, 
Sept. 25, 2006,  http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=2489737; 
Complaint, Kasadore Ramkisson v. AOL, No. 06-5866 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 22, 
2006) (bringing suit under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2702, for posting AOL users search queries).  
26 EPIC RFID Privacy Page, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/ (last visited Feb. 
15, 2007); see U.S. Patent App. 20020165758 (filed May 3, 2001), available at 
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPT
O%2Fsrchnum.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=%2220020165758%22.PGNR.&OS
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The NCR Corporation27 stated that RFID-enabled loyalty cards permit 
businesses to identify customers and change the prices of items based on the 
purchasing profile of the customer.28  A clothing retailer could tag 
purchased garments with customers’ credit card information and determine 
how much money they are likely to spend as they enter the store.29  Sales 
representatives could quickly target or avoid customers depending on their 
historical purchasing habits.30  RFID data collection could be used as 
evidence in divorce trials, helping prove where and when a spouse was 
being unfaithful.31  Thieves could use RFID devices to determine if their 
culprits are carrying expensive items in their purses.32  As these examples 
show, “the ability to remain anonymous is eroded.”33  With personal 
information available to anyone who has a reader, privacy will soon become 
obsolete unless there are laws regulating the potential for Orwellian 
surveillance.   
III. DO CONSUMERS HAVE A RIGHT TO PRIVACY FROM RFIDS 
UNDER TORT LAW? 
¶9 Consumers have a right to privacy under the common law tort of 
intrusion upon seclusion only when two elements are satisfied.  First, the 
information must be pulled in places that are highly “offensive or 
objectionable to a reasonable man,” and second, “the thing into which there 
is prying or intrusion [is] entitled to be, private.”34  Intrusion upon seclusion 
is a tort protecting individuals against “intentional[] intru[sion], physically 
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs 
                                                                                                                       
=DN/20020165758&RS=DN/20020165758 (describing a method for tracking 
identities and characteristics of individuals to “monitor movement throughout 
the store.”); U.S. Patent No. 6,659,344 (filed Dec. 6, 2000), available at 
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-
Parser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPT
O%2Fsrchnum.htm&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=6659344.PN.&OS=PN/6659344&RS
=PN/6659344 (describing a method of gathering data of supermarket shoppers 
behaviors by placing readers on shopping carts in order to “take specific 
responses to the actions of the shoppers”).  
27 “NCR Corporation . . . along with its subsidiaries provides technology and 
services that help businesses interact, connect and relate with their customers.” 
Google Finance, http://finance.google.com/finance?q=NCR (last visited Feb. 15, 
2007).   
28 ALBRECHT &  MCINTYRE, supra note 7, at 74.  
29 See id. at 74–75. 
30 See id.  
31 Declan McCullagh, RFID Tags: Big Brother in Small Packages, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Jan. 13, 2003, http://news.com.com/2010-1069-980325.html. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. 
34 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 390–91 (1960).  
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or concerns . . . if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person.”35  Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis introduced the theory of the 
right to privacy in 1890, proclaiming that “[t]he right to life has come to 
mean the right to enjoy life,—the right to be let alone.”36  When people are 
in the seclusion of their home, they are undoubtedly entitled to privacy.37  
However, an individual’s expectation of privacy is not limited to inside the 
home.38  A reasonable expectation of privacy can exist in one’s shopping 
bag in a store,39 when one withdraws money from a bank account,40 and in 
a phone booth.41  In order for the plaintiff to have a claim, the defendant 
must have “penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy 
surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff.”42  
¶10 In the context of RFIDs, there are some situations where gathering 
information from RFID tags violates consumers’ privacy expectations.  For 
example, a consumer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when carrying RFID equipped items in a transparent shopping cart.  
However, once the items are placed in an opaque bag, a right to privacy 
immediately arises.43  If a business or third-party gathers data about the 
items once the items are no longer visible to the naked eye, there is an 
objective invasion of privacy.44  Gathering information stored in the RFID 
tag in a winter jacket worn in public is also not an invasion of privacy, yet 
pulling data off undergarments is intrusive.45  However, since the home is 
always considered a private place, once an active RFID tag enters the home, 
any information gathered, including information from the winter jacket, 
immediately offends the principles of privacy.  Protecting consumers from 
unreasonably intrusive actions of businesses requires that RFID tags 
become unreadable once they enter private places.  However, the 
fundamental nature of the technology does not harmonize with this privacy 
                                                     
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
36 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4. HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
37 See Prosser, supra note 34, at 392; see also DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 
149 (Mich. 1881) (finding a right to privacy in one’s apartment).  
38 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967). 
39 Prosser, supra note 34, at 389 (citing Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 
716 (W. Va. 1959)).  
40 Nader v. General Motors, 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).  
41 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359.  
42 Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d. 469, 490 (Cal. 1998). 
43 See Prosser, supra note 34 at 390-91. 
44 Id. 
45 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c (1977) (“Even in a public 
place . . . there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or 
lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be an 
invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.”). 
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goal because RFID readers do not scrutinize whether the information is 
considered private before it gathers data from the tag.  
¶11 For the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, the “highly offensive” 
element normally requires more than simple visual surveillance or 
photography in a public place unless the individual is attempting to keep his 
actions private.46  Thus, the moment an individual enters a private place, 
actions that were not considered highly offensive because they occurred in 
public should be immediately deemed highly offensive.  It follows that any 
item entering the home with a readable RFID tag should be highly offensive 
to the reasonable person.  However, with new and continuously evolving 
technologies, what individuals consider offensive and private is continually 
changing.  For example, in Dwyer v. American Express Co.,47 the court 
rejected an American Express cardholder’s claim of intrusion upon 
seclusion when American Express data-mined the plaintiff’s spending 
patterns and sold the collected information to merchants.48  The court 
stated:  
By using the American Express card, a cardholder is voluntarily, and 
necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will 
reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and shopping preferences.  We 
cannot hold that a defendant has committed an unauthorized intrusion 
by compiling the information voluntarily given to it and then renting 
its compilation.49
¶12 With new technologies come new methods of consumer tracking 
and changing parameters for what may be considered highly offensive.  
These new methods of tracking are not considered intrusive simply because 
the nature of the technology requires consumer purchases to be recorded.  If 
individuals make active decisions to use a credit card instead of cash—a 
voluntary act—their purchases can be tracked.  Similarly, the gathering of 
information stored on RFID technology in consumer goods may not be 
deemed highly offensive depending on changing consumer expectations.  
¶13 The ability to track an item and an individual at any time does not 
alone make the technology highly offensive.  Rather, the ability of RFID 
technology to track an item becomes highly offensive where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  With RFID technology third parties are 
able to secretly track individuals by “skimming” and “eavesdropping.”50  
                                                     
46 Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 914–15 (1999) (citing 
Shulman, 955 P.2d. at 490). 
47 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
48 Id. at 1353. 
49 Id. at 1354 (emphasis added). 
50 Another major privacy issue with RFID tags, both in identification cards and 
consumer products, relates to private third parties skimming or eavesdropping. 
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Data that may otherwise not be available to third parties becomes readily 
obtainable at any place where there is an active RFID reader.  Thus, the 
placement and presence of RFID tags in consumer goods permits the highly 
intrusive gathering of information when the items are in private places.  
Despite this issue, individuals will have a difficult time bringing a valid 
cause of action since they will not know when items they carry are equipped 
with RFID tags and whether the information is being procured when they 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
IV. WHAT CHALLENGES ARISE WHEN USING TORT LAW TO 
REDRESS RFID OFFENSES? 
¶14 It is often difficult to meet the burden of proof required for intrusion 
upon seclusion.51  There are some circumstances, including when the item 
is in public view, where gathering information from RFIDs is almost never 
tortious.  There are other circumstances when the same act of information 
gathering is tortious.  For example, in Nader v. General Motors, the court 
stated that “only ‘overzealous’ public surveillance is actionable.”52  It is 
difficult to argue that a small RFID chip, sewn into clothing seams, is 
“overzealous” public surveillance.  Therefore, it is inaccurate to conclude 
that using RFID technology to collect data is highly offensive when the 
information can be gathered by means that are not “overzealous.”53   
¶15 Additionally, under the theory of intrusion upon seclusion, plaintiffs 
must prove damages, which could be difficult for this technology.54  For a 
successful intrusion upon seclusion action against a business or individual 
that uses RFID technology, a plaintiff can “recover damages for (a) the 
harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion; (b) his mental 
                                                                                                                       
Two Reports Criticize Security, Privacy Holes in RFID Technology, EPIC 
ALERT 13.22 (Electronic Privacy Information Center, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 
1, 2006, http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_13.22.html (“Skimming occurs 
when information from an RFID chip is surreptitiously gathered by an 
unauthorized individual. Eavesdropping occurs when an individual intercepts 
data as it is read by an authorized RFID reader.”). While third party 
interferences are mentioned, a detailed analysis of the issues of skimming and 
eavesdropping is beyond the scope of this iBrief. 
51 Adam J. Tutaj, Intrusion Upon Seclusion: Bringing an Otherwise Valid Cause 
of Action into the 21st Century, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 665, 666 (1998). 
52 Id. at 683 (quoting 255 N.E.2d 765,771 (N.Y. 1970)). In Nader, the 
defendants engaged in unauthorized surveillance of bank records. Nader, 255 
N.E.2d at 765.  
53 Tutaj, supra note 51 at 666.  
54 Alan F. Blakley, Daniel P. Garrie, & Matthew J. Armstrong, Coddling Spies: 
Why the Law Doesn’t Adequately Address Computer Spyware, 2005 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 0025 (2005), 
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0025.html.  
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distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a kind that normally results 
from such an invasion; and (c) special damage of which the invasion is a 
legal cause.”55  The Restatement (Second) of Torts is silent on whether a 
plaintiff could receive restitution damages for the value that the defendant 
gained by intruding upon the seclusion of the plaintiff.56  A separate cause 
of action may need to be brought for a plaintiff to receive restitution.  
¶16 With respect to the amount of damages that make a cause of action 
feasible, a single plaintiff’s legal claim against a retailer for scanning will 
probably not amount to enough relief for the claim to be justified, especially 
since punitive damages are not guaranteed.  Further, since most individuals 
are not aware of the existence of RFID tags in their purchases,57 and 
because the technology does not require any true physical imposition on the 
individual, retailers and manufacturers will not be pressured to cease their 
intrusive actions on scattered tort claims.  In addition, from a plaintiff’s or 
mass-tort perspective, it is not feasible to bring a suit against all 
manufacturers and retailers that use RFID technology.  And, it is not 
effective for a plaintiff to bring suit against only one company because a 
cause of action against one business would not impinge on the actions of 
other businesses.  To prohibit all retailers from using RFIDs in intrusive 
manners, the plaintiff would have to sue every retailer and plead for 
injunctive relief.  While one win for the plaintiff may deter other possible 
defendants, a cost-benefit analysis by large companies using RFID 
technology would likely justify continued use.  
¶17 RFID tracking is tortious under a theory of intrusion upon seclusion 
only when a reader pulls information from RFID tags when the item is 
located in a place where its owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
and when the action is highly offensive.  While there are some situations 
where both elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion are satisfied, 
such as when the RFID is located in the privacy of one’s home, there are 
many potentially intrusive uses of RFID for which it will be difficult for a 
plaintiff to prove the tortious conduct and establish harm.  Furthermore, 
even if RFID technology is “overzealous” and even if it is practical for a 
plaintiff to bring a claim, courts have been reluctant to permit plaintiffs to 
use intrusion upon seclusion for technology claims in the twenty-first 
                                                     
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977). 
56 “One whose name, likeness or identity is appropriated to the use of another, 
under [Restatement (Second) of Torts] § 652C, may recover for the loss of the 
exclusive use of the value so appropriated.” Id. at cmt. a. When there has been 
appropriation, the plaintiff may recover a value equal to that of which the 
defendant was enriched by the fraud.  Id. 
57 A survey “conducted by Capgemini and National Federation found that 77% 
of consumers were not familiar with RFID.”  Bacheldor, supra note 24.  
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century.58  As new technologies continue to enter the market, an industry 
sector approach to regulation is becoming the legal trend: Congress passes 
statutes for industry-specific technology to protect consumer privacy.59  
However, almost a decade after the birth of RFIDs, the technology has yet 
to be regulated.  
V. WITHOUT TORT LAW, WHAT PROTECTS CONSUMERS? 
¶18 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which governs RFIDs, 
currently permits companies to craft their own guidelines concerning the 
use of customer data collected through RFID technology.60  As part of self-
regulation, the FTC encourages businesses to notify consumers of the 
existence of RFIDs in their products and to inform customers of the type of 
data that is being collected and the data’s intended use.61  However, the 
FTC “has not taken any enforcement actions against any companies and has 
not compiled any statistics as to who is using RFID technology . . . .”62  
Under the current self-regulatory scheme, it is unlikely that the FTC will 
ever take enforcement actions because it can only enforce regulations that a 
company sets for itself and subsequently violates.63  Thus, if a company 
does not establish standards for self-enforcement, then failing to notify the 
user of the existence of RFIDs will not be a violation and the FTC cannot 
take action.  As there are very limited situations in which the FTC would 
have the ability to take enforcement actions, self-regulation is not an 
effective means of regulation. 
¶19 Without current laws actively monitoring and regulating the actions 
of businesses’ RFID uses, the information gathering and aggregation 
occurring as a result of RFID technology may expose customers to harmful 
invasions of privacy.  Although state legislatures have begun efforts to 
legislate RFID technology at the state level and privacy advocates have set 
forth numerous state legislative proposals, federal regulation is ultimately 
needed to effectively protect consumers.  The efforts at the state level have 
                                                     
58 See White v. White, 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001) (finding no 
reasonable expectation to privacy in e-mail).  
59 Hildner, supra note 4, at n.144 (listing industry-specific technologies).  
60 Jonathan Collins, FTC Asks RFID Users to Self-Regulate, RFID J., Mar. 10, 
2005, http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/view/1437/1/1/;  see, 5 U.S.C. §§ 41–
58 (2000) (Federal Trade Commission Act). 
61 Collins, supra note 60.   
62 Claire Swedberg, FTC Readies an RFID Report, RFID J., Oct. 5, 2004, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleprint/1151/-1/1/. 
63 Hildner, supra note 4, at 145 (noting further, that if FTC chooses to institute 
its own regulatory guidelines the investigation and negotiation before judicial 
review bodies would be burdensome to the FTC and likely cause lengthy 
procedural delays).  
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not been very successful and the proposals from advocacy groups are 
limited in scope.  International regulatory regimes, while not perfect, may 
provide some guidance as to how the United States should tackle the RFID 
issue.  
A. RFID Regulation at the State Level 
¶20 In 2006, at least seventeen states introduced RFID-related 
legislation.64  Georgia, New Hampshire and Wisconsin adopted RFID-
related legislation while California and Rhode Island each vetoed RFID-
related bills.65  In 2005, privacy bills regulating RFIDs were introduced in 
twelve state legislatures.66  Likewise, in 2004, several state legislatures 
actively sought RFID legislation.67  
¶21 RFID legislation at the state level typically targets five different  
issues: 
1. “Requir[ing] disclosure”; 
2. “Requir[ing] removal or deactivation”; 
3. “Prohibit[ing] linking RFID data to personal 
information”; 
4. “Prohibit[ing] use” in general; and 
5. Criminalization.68  
¶22 These state legislative measures, however, have not adequately 
addressed the privacy concerns raised by RFID technology for several 
                                                     
64 2006 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency Identification, NEWS 
FROM THE STATES (National Conference of State Legislatures), Oct. 2006, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid06.htm.   
65 Id.  
662005 Privacy Legislation Related to Radio Frequency Identification, NEWS 
FROM THE STATES (National Conference of State Legislatures), Jan. 30, 2006, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/privacy/rfid05.htm.  
67 See H.B. 32, 418th Gen Assem., Reg Sess. (Md. 2004); S.J.R. 10, 56th Leg., 
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2004), H.B. 1304, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004); H.B. 314, 56th Leg. 
Gen Sess. (Utah 2004); H.B. 251, 56th Leg. Gen Sess. (Utah 2004); S.B. 867, 
92nd Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2004); S.B. 1834, 2004 Reg. Sess., 
(Cal. 2004); H.B. 151, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004). Maryland, Utah and Virginia’s 
bill suggest guidelines for future legislation; Missouri’s bills require labeling; 
Utah’s bills require labeling and address the requirement for disabling the 
device; and  California’s bill addresses the use of personal information. Joshua 
Nelson, State Legislatures Address Use of RFID Technology, NEWS FROM THE 
STATES (National Conference of State Legislatures), Summer 2004, 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/CIP/CIPCOMM/summer04.htm. 
68 2006 Privacy Legislation, supra note 64.  
 13
2007 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 3 
reasons.  First, no proposed legislation in 2006 confronted all of the alleged 
privacy and security issues associated with RFIDs.  Second, a majority of 
the legislation presented limited situations where prohibition of data linking 
is enforceable.69  Third, regulating RFID technology at the state level is 
inherently inefficient because customers who purchase goods in states 
where there are no RFID regulations or enforcement are not protected from 
retailers located within their home state.  For example, if a consumer 
purchases a shirt in a state that does not require disclosure of the presence of 
RFID technology to consumers, when the consumer returns to his own 
home state, information could be read from the RFID tag in his clothing of 
which he is not aware.  The consumer does not have the ability to know that 
information is being pulled from him, nor the opportunity, as some statutes 
permit, to allow him to request a copy of the information gathered and its 
intended use.  Since RFID technology is used to track inventory nationally 
and manufacturers supply products to various states, regulating at state 
levels interferes with efficient commerce.  This is not an effective way to 
protect the privacy of our nation’s citizens or promote economy.  
¶23 Currently, there is no federal legislation relating to RFIDs.  The 
only federal action is a proposal for an RFID Caucus.70  With legislation 
occurring at state rather than federal levels, the necessary protections for 
consumers have not been established by, let alone introduced to, Congress.  
B. Proposals from Privacy Advocates 
¶24 Preserving basic liberty rights of a society with technological 
advances requires a sensitive balance between creating stringent legal 
standards that protect individuals and relaxed regulations that do not deter 
innovation and efficiency.  As a technology, RFIDs have the capability to 
increase efficiency in multiple arenas, especially the retail sector.  The 
resulting privacy issues, however, are of prime concern.  Privacy advocates 
have tried to protect consumer fears by proposing multiple regulations and 
model codes that place duties on businesses when using RFID technology in 
                                                     
69 Id. (explaining that most bills permit exceptions to the prohibition of data 
linking when discussing state or federally issued identification cards). 
70 Rfidblogger, Senators Form RFID Caucus, RFID LAW BLOG, June 26, 2006, 
http://rfidlawblog.mckennalong.com/archives/federal-legislation-senators-form-
rfid-caucus.html (stating that the purpose of the caucus is to “[p]rotect exciting 
new technologies from premature regulation or legislation in search of a 
problem.”). There is also “[f]ederal legislation that details security provisions 
that must be in place for Federal Employee ID cards using contact and 
contactless smart cards.” CA State Legislation Update, (Association for 
Automatic Identification and Mobility), Aug. 29, 2005, 
http://www.aimglobal.org/members/news/templates/rfid.asp?articleid=434&zon
eid=3. However, these standards do not protect consumers.  
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their products.  Each proposal attempts to address the privacy concerns of 
consumers by placing restrictions on businesses.  Among these proposals 
are the Fair Information Practices, The RFID Right to Know Act of 2003, 
Electronic Privacy Information Center’s Guidelines on Commercial Use of 
RFID Technology, and regulations in the international arena, all of which 
detail various means to achieve the requisite balance between efficiency and 
personal privacy. 
1. Fair Information Practices 
¶25 Fair Information Practices refers to the “manner in which entities 
collect and use personal information.”71  The first comprehensive use of 
Fair Information Practices appeared in 1973 in the United States 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s report, Records, Computers 
and the Rights of Citizens.72  Since then, Fair Information Practices have 
been used as the foundation for American privacy laws.  While some 
organizations have fashioned proposed regulations based on Fair 
Information Practices, for the purposes of RFID privacy, Fair Information 
Practices simply create the basis for a model code detailing principles to 
safeguard information privacy.  Fair Information Practices are founded on 
“five core principles of privacy protection”: notice, choice, access, security, 
and enforcement.73 
¶26 If the notion of Fair Information Practices expressly regulated RFID 
privacy, a retailer or manufacturer would set privacy regulations for 
information gathering and storage.  The notice principle would require 
consumers to receive “clear and conspicuous notice of an entity’s 
information practices before any personal information is collected from 
them . . . .”74  To comply with the notice requirement, retailers would have 
to label items with tags or stickers warning the purchaser that the item is 
equipped with RFID technology.  Further, the label would be required to 
mention the purpose of the RFID tag in the specific product, the type of data 
the tag collects, how the collected data is used, and the means by which the 
information is kept confidential.  The choice principle provides consumers 
the right to determine how the information gathered about them is used after 
a transaction is complete.75  This principle permits consumers to consent to 
the actions taken by the retailer.  For instance, the consumer has the right to 
                                                     
71 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
June 1998, http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.htm.  
72 Id. at n.27.  
73 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 71.  
74 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION 
PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE 14 (May 2000), 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000text.pdf.  
75 Id. at 15.  
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decide if the retailer can use his personal collected data for “secondary 
uses,” such as marketing lists for other companies.76  The access principle 
permits an individual the right to view the gathered information and dispute 
its accuracy such that incorrect data does not adversely affect the consumer 
based on the retailers’ intended uses.77  The security principle requires 
retailers to protect the gathered information.78  This may require RFID 
encryption, tag removal once an item is purchased, and installation of 
database protection technology.  Enforcement of the aforementioned 
guidelines is essential for consumers to feel comfortable when businesses 
use RFID technology. 
¶27 While Fair Information Practices are composed of crucial principles 
that protect consumers from RFID threats, the application of these five 
standards is not the end all to regulating RFIDs.  Fair Information Practices 
do not guarantee absolute consumer protection because information can still 
be collected from unsuspecting customers.  Specifically, with regards to 
RFIDs, the principles do not account for the type of customer profiling that 
RFID technology allows.  Even if a consumer purchases a product with a 
secure RFID tag (security), knows that the purchasing information will be 
gathered from the tag (notice), understands that the information will not be 
sold to a third party (consent), but does not remove the tag after purchase, 
the regulations of RFIDs are not entirely effective.  Any RFID tag that 
remains on a product after tender jeopardizes the integrity of Fair 
Information Practices because the tracking continues to take place.  RFID 
regulations should permit retailers to use RFID technology to increase 
supply-chain efficiency but not at the expense of consumer privacy.  There 
is a privacy failure if all five principles are satisfied, yet a third party inside 
or outside the walls of a store can gather information from the RFID tag as a 
result of the information gathering and storage.  Thus, Fair Information 
Practices are not an adequate means of RFID privacy regulation.  
2. RFID Right to Know Act 
¶28 The RFID Right to Know Act, created by Consumers Against 
Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (“CASPIAN”), stipulates 
mandatory labeling requirements for products equipped with RFID 
technology.79  The act suggests amendments to current statutes as a means 
                                                     
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 16. 
78 Id. at 18.  
79 Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering: RFID 
Right to Know Act of 2003, http://www.nocards.org/rfid/rfidbill.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2007) (“[C]ommodities containing radio frequency 
identification tags bear labels stating that fact, to protect consumer privacy, and 
for other purposes.”).  
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of protecting consumer privacy.  These amendments include changes to Fair 
Packaging and Labeling Program,80 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act,81 Federal Alcohol Administration Act,82 Federal Cigarette Labeling 
and Advertising Act,83 and Chapter 94—Privacy of Title 15 of the U.S. 
Code.84  The proposed legislation amends the language in the 
aforementioned statutes to mandate clear and conspicuous labeling on any 
“consumer commodity or package” that includes an RFID tag.85  The 
suggested amendment to Title 15, Chapter 94—Privacy, creates an 
additional subchapter titled “AGGREGRATION OF NONPUBLIC 
PERSONAL INFORMATION AND RADIO FREQUENCY 
INDENTIFICATION INFORMATION.”86  The proposed subchapter 
details that businesses shall not: 
• “combine or link an individual’s nonpublic 
information with RFID tag identification information 
beyond what is required to manage inventory.”87 
• “disclose to a nonaffiliated third party an individual’s 
nonpublic information in association with RFID tag 
identification information.”88 
• “use RFID tag identification information to identify an 
individual.”89 
In addition, the subchapter requires the FTC to create standards to insure the 
integrity of the information gathering, security, and general harm caused by 
RFIDs.90  Under the proposed legislation the FTC must also disseminate 
general educational information regarding RFIDs to consumers and 
businesses as well as enforcement.  
¶29 Amendments to current statutes are a more effective means of 
protecting consumer privacy than Fair Information Practices.  On the 
positive side, the RFID Right to Know Act provides detailed musts and 
must-nots by requiring notice on labels and prohibiting certain uses of 
private information.  However, the Act also has limitations. The Act does 
not consider regulations of consumer products that are not food, drug, 
                                                     
80 15 U.S.C. § 1453 (2000).  
81 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2000).  
82 27 U.S.C. § 215 (2000).  
83 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).  
84 15 U.S.C. Ch. 94.  
85 RFID Right to Know Act, supra note 79.  
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
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cosmetics, alcohol, and cigarettes.  While these types of consumer goods, 
most of which are regulated by the FDA, are all commonly equipped with 
RFID technology, it is the items that consumers carry with them in public, 
specifically clothing and shoes, that require the most stringent regulations, 
and are not addressed by the Right to Know Act.  Also, one is more likely 
to receive poor customer service based on purchasing habits in a retail store 
than in grocery stores.  Amending legislation for specific consumer goods is 
not an efficient way to regulate consumer privacy.  Although regulations at 
the federal level are crucial, regulating individual products one by one is not 
effective.  The proposed amendment to Chapter 94-Privacy of Title 15 of 
the U.S. Code does not regulate specific products, yet amendments to this 
section alone are also insufficient.  While it is important for information 
linked to individuals to be protected, it is just as crucial to address in detail 
the general issues proposed by Fair Information Practices.  
3. Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
¶30 EPIC, a leading public interest research center on privacy issues has 
formed Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology.91  The 
guidelines require businesses to notify potential RFID tag holders of the 
presence of tags and readers and signal the tag holder when the reader is 
pulling information from the tag.92  The guidelines stipulate that the tags 
must be removable and require an analysis to ensure that there are no less 
intrusive means to achieve the same goal.  If less intrusive means are not 
available, the user must obtain written consent after disclosing the purpose, 
extent and use of the data collection.  According to EPIC’s guidelines, 
under no circumstance may personal identification data be distributed to 
third parties.93  Additionally, the collected data must be secure, information 
relating to data collecting policies must be available to tag holders, and an 
individual’s personal data may be retrieved upon written notice to the 
business. 94 
¶31 These regulations provide a thorough application of privacy laws to 
potential RFID uses. However, the guidelines do not protect an individual’s 
privacy outside the commercial arena and create high transaction costs for 
businesses, which would likely be transferred to the consumer.  From the 
standpoint of data collection by corporations, the stringent limitation on use 
may be a disincentive to employ RFID technology at all.  While the burden 
to protect privacy in the commercial environment is rightfully placed on the 
retailer and the manufacturer, the EPIC guidelines give consumers 
                                                     
91 See Guidelines on Commercial Use of RFID Technology, EPIC.org, July 9, 
2004, http://www.epic.org/privacy/rfid/rfid_gdlnes-070904.pdf.
92 Id. at 2–3. 
93 Id. at 3. 
94 Id. 
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unlimited authority to request information regarding their collected personal 
data from the businesses using RFID technology.  There are two issues with 
this provision of the proposed regulation that affect the business and the 
consumer.  First, if consumers wish to continually view data collected by a 
business, they would have to write multiple letters to the business to keep 
track of the personal information the business has gathered.  Second, the 
business would be forced to aggregate data in way that accommodates 
generating reports for every single consumer.  This aggregation would 
require information to be stored in such a way that requires data to be 
attached to a consumer’s identity—which is contrary to the goals of RFID 
regulation.  In general, EPIC’s proposal would increase costs to business 
without the balanced benefits to the consumer.   
C. International Approaches 
¶32 At the International Conference of Data Protection & Privacy 
Commissions a resolution of the required standards for RFID use was 
adopted.  The standards require: 
• an analysis to ensure that less intrusive means in 
achieving the same goal are not possible; 
• that the gathered information is “open and 
transparent”; 
• that any collected data is stored only until the purpose 
of the information gathering is complete; and  
• that the data on the tags are destroyable.95 
¶33 The European Union also has its own regulations in place that 
protect privacy.  In fact, there are “strong laws governing the use of data 
gathered on consumer[s].”96  Although the regulations were not initially 
enacted for the specific uses of RFIDs, the preexisting laws protect personal 
data associated with RFIDs.  In Europe, protections are in place because of 
the limited range of frequencies for RFID readers.97  Additionally, the 
                                                     
95 Resolution of Radio Frequency Identification, International Conference of 
Data Protection & Privacy Commissions, Nov. 20, 2003, 
http://www.privacyconference2003.org/resolutions/res5.DOC. 
96 Reuven R. Levary, David Thompson, Kristen Kot & Julie Brothers, RFID, 
Electronic Eavesdropping and the Law, RFID J., Feb. 14, 2005, 
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/1401/1/128. 
97 “In the US, there are 60 channels that can be used for deploying RFID readers, 
however in Europe there are only 10 channels. This is because a 26 MHz 
spectrum is available in the US but only 2 MHz is available in Europe.” RFID in 
Europe, RFID GAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.rfidgazette.org/2005/09/rfid_in_europe.html.  
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“personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully.”98  In the United 
Kingdom, for example, fair and lawful processing of data requires notice to 
the consumer and either “consent, contractual necessity, [or] legitimate 
interest.”99  The “e-privacy directive” also requires there to be individual 
notice of the data uses, ability to withdraw consent, and capability to 
prevent temporary data processing to track consumers’ locations.100 
¶34 These standards are in line with those of the Fair Information 
Practices as a means to ensure uniformity within international borders. 
However, the international resolution is more restrictive on business than 
Fair Information Practices and provides greater protections to consumers.  
A balancing test should be the baseline for RFID regulation in the United 
States.  A balancing test will restrict businesses’ uses of RFID technology in 
unnecessary situations, while not inhibiting the needed increased 
efficiencies.  A balancing test also requires businesses to contemplate their 
infringement on their customers’ privacy before implementing unnecessary 
tracking standards.  Additionally, the approach the European Union has 
taken to limit information gathering by restricting the frequencies available 
to RFID is an effective way to limit RFID tracking without banning all uses 
of the technology.  
VI. A SOLUTION. 
¶35 According to Kevin Ashton, “[i]t's game over that RFID will be 
adopted.”101  If Ashton is correct, legislation is required to ensure that the 
efficiencies of RFID technology continue to exist, while consumer privacy 
is protected.  Since tort law claims for this technology are not effective, 
state laws covering RFIDs are inconsistent and inadequate, and the 
proposed federal regulations are flawed, ensuring that RFID use does not 
become ubiquitous before appropriate regulations are in place requires 
additional action.  
¶36 Before the enactment of any RFID legislation, the effects of 
technology-specific legislation should be considered.  With new 
technologies continually entering the market, adopting regulations that do 
not consider the future may have an ill effect on privacy protection for 
future surveillance technologies.  RFIDs provide cost effective means to 
                                                     
98 Eduardo Ustaran, Data Protection and RFID Systems, 3 PRIVACY & DATA 
PROTECTION 6, http://www.berwinleighton.com/download/PDP-
RFIDtagsimplications.pdf; see Laurant, supra note 5 (quoting Directive on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications, OFFICIAL J. EUR. COMMUNITIES 37, 
July 12, 2002, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_201/l_20120020731en00370047.pdf). 
99 Ustaran, supra note 98.  
100 Id. at 7. 
101 MANEY, supra note 4.  
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track items and people, but overly strict regulations can deter necessary 
RFID uses.  Regulations that are too lenient, however, permit businesses to 
impinge on consumers’ privacy rights.  
¶37 Since the scope of RFID uses and potential costs are not certain at 
this time, it is crucial that RFID-specific legislation is avoided. Instead, 
legislation prohibiting the “underlying behavior” violating privacy 
principles should be adopted.102  One effective way to address RFID 
legislation at the federal level is to amend various federal privacy laws as 
suggested by the Right to Know Act.  Since the federal government has 
many broad privacy protection statutes, general amendments are a good 
approach.  For example, the suggested amendment to Chapter 94-Privacy, 
of Title 15 of the U.S. Code creating an additional subchapter titled 
“AGGREGRATION OF NONPUBLIC PERSONAL INFORMATION 
AND RADIO FREQUENCY INDENTIFICATION INFORMATION” 
would protect collected information that is not intended to be public 
information.  However, the words “Radio Frequency Identification” should 
not be included in order to avoid technology specific legislation.  Included 
in this section should be prohibitions against all technologies that gather 
more information than is required to manage inventory.  Additionally, as 
suggested by the Right to Know Act, the language in the amendment should 
prohibit disclosure of gathered information by electronic means to any third 
party.  
¶38 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) also 
addresses the privacy of individuals.103  The “act prohibits any person from 
intentionally intercepting, or endeavoring to intercept wire, oral or 
electronic communications by using an electronic, mechanical, or other 
device unless the conduct is specifically authorized or expressly not 
covered.”104  Although the current language of the act does not specifically 
cover RFID technology, small amendments to the act could encompass the 
mal-intended behaviors of retailers and third-parties.105 
¶39 One of the paramount concerns to consumers is their lack of 
awareness that the products they purchase are equipped with RFID 
technology.  Encompassed in the Wiretap Act106 is the requirement that 
“anyone who intercepts electronic communication will be held in violation 
of the statute if proper consent has not been obtained.”107  Amending the 
                                                     
102 Tavilla, supra note 21, at 15. 
103 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000); see Levary, supra note 96. 
104 Levary, supra note 96. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000).  
105 See John Eden, When Big Brother Privatizes: Commercial Surveillance, The 
Privacy Act of 1974, and the Future of RFID, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0020 
(2005), http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2005dltr0020.html.  
106 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000); see Levary, supra note 96.  
107 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).   
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Wiretap Act so that RFID communications fall within the purview of 
electronic communications would suffice for the consent aspect of privacy 
protection from RFID tracking.  This amendment would require businesses 
to obtain consent from consumers for RFID tracking. This need not be 
onerous for businesses or consumers. Obtaining consent could simply 
require a standard label on all items that have the ability to communicate 
information to consumers.  By purchasing items with conspicuous labels the 
consumer is essentially consenting to information gathering108 in the least 
restrictive way needed by the business to achieve reasonable goals. 
¶40 Since violations of many current privacy statutes impose criminality 
on the violators, businesses have a strong incentive to remain within the 
boundaries imposed by these and similar regulations.  If retailers and 
manufactures believe that RFIDs are important to their supply chains, they 
will follow broad privacy legislation.   
CONCLUSION  
¶41 Since “the RFID train is beginning to leave the station, . . . now is 
the right time to begin a national discussion about where, if at all, any lines 
will be drawn to protect privacy.”109  RFID technology provides many 
benefits for the retail and consumer products industries.  As more time 
passes without the requisite legislation in place, consumers may lose the 
ability to protect their privacy from RFID tracking, or businesses may be 
faced with an unexpected halt to their RFID uses.  
¶42 Individuals have a right to keep their private things, which include 
information not typically available to the naked eye, private.  However, 
because intrusion upon seclusion, the typical conduit for privacy actions, is 
unable to protect individuals’ privacy from RFID tracking by businesses, a 
new standard is required.  State legislation is inadequate and implanting 
proposals from privacy advocates is unreasonable. This leaves federal 
legislation as the means of privacy protection.  Amending existing federal 
privacy statutes, without enacting RFID-specific legislation, is the most 
effective alternative to control the “global blanket” of RFIDs.  
 
                                                     
108 In this situation there is implied consent. “Implied consent is ‘consent in fact’ 
which is inferred ‘from surrounding circumstances indicating that the party 
knowingly agreed to the surveillance.’” Williams v. Poulos 11 F.3d 271, 281 
(1st Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
109 Senator Patrick Leahy, Panel Discussion on Video Surveillance:  Legal and 
Technological Challenges at Georgetown University Law Center (Mar. 23, 
2004), available at http://www.spychips.com/alec-big-brother-barcode-
article.html. 
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